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Chapter 5. China, climate change and the Arctic environment 
 
Sanna Kopra, Karoliina Hurri, Liisa Kauppila, Adam Stepien, and Yulia Yamineva 
 





In recent decades, the Arctic region has faced major environmental changes. In particular, there is 
growing scientific evidence that Arctic climate change is proceeding much faster than expected 
earlier: the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free in summer as early as the late 2030s (AMAP, 2017: 3). 
At the same time, the melting of ice and permafrost in the High North is accelerating climate 
change and altering ecosystems globally, including in China (ACIA, 2004; AMAP, 2017). Climate 
change is a complex global problem that cannot be solved through regional actions by Arctic states 
and hence, global efforts are necessary to respond to climate change. China, the world’s biggest 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, plays a crucial role in those efforts – without its participation, any 
effort to prevent dangerous climate change from happening will fail. For China, climate change is 
also an important driver of the state’s Arctic engagement: the Chinese government argues that due 
to the adverse effects of climate change, it has special interests in the Arctic and it must have a 
chance to be involved in Arctic governance. In this chapter, we investigate China’s role and 
interests in international climate politics, and discuss their implications for the Arctic. We offer a 
short historical overview of China’s role in the United Nations (UN) negotiations on climate 
change as well as its domestic climate mitigation policies. Since the very beginning in the late 
1980s, China has taken an active part – if not always with enthusiasm – in international 
negotiations on climate change. Today, China is party to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, which 
establish the keystones of international climate regime. In addition, we study the extent to which 
China’s Arctic policy addresses climate change. We also take a look at China’s broader ecological 
footprint in the High North.  
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5.2. China’s contribution to Arctic environmental change 
 
Today, it is evident that human activities such as burning fossil fuels have increased the 
concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere and hence caused climate change 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). In October 2018, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change made very clear that to prevent the most dangerous climate change from 
happening, we must reduce global net carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 2010 levels by 45 
percent before 2030 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). Although only a small 
proportion of global greenhouse gas emissions originate in the Arctic, the region has emerged as 
a showcase of global warming and its impacts. In the Arctic, temperatures have risen more rapidly 
than in any other region on earth during the last 30 years. As a result, sea ice, permafrost and snow 
cover have decreased dramatically, which hampers the livelihoods of local people and threatens 
the survival of many Arctic species such as the polar bear, the walrus and the seal, for instance 
(see, for example, ACIA, 2004; AMAP, 2017; Serreze, 2018). Arctic environmental change also 
has significant global impacts, and it may have an influence on Southeast Asian monsoon and 
winter haze in China, for instance (ibid.; Wang, Chen & Liu, 2015.). At the same time, the warming 
climate brings new economic opportunities for resource exploitation, fisheries, shipping, and 
tourism – further intensifying the already high pressure on the Arctic environment. 
In line with China’s rapid economic growth, its total greenhouse gas emissions have grown 
at extraordinary speed during the past couple of decades. Between 1990 and 2013, China’s carbon 
dioxide emissions increased by 80 percent (Olivier et al., 2015: 10). In brief, China’s total energy 
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions started to grow significantly from 2001 onwards when 
China joined the World Trade Organization, which directed the nation towards heavy and chemical 
industries instead of centralizing to modern technologies (Chen, 2012). China’s emissions also 
grew because of huge infrastructure projects such as the Three Gorges Dam (ibid.). Today, China 
is the world's biggest contributor to climate change – in 2017, its greenhouse gas emissions 
accounted for 27 percent of global emissions (Olivier & Peters, 2018). In terms of per capita 
emissions, however, China’s emissions are much lower than those of the United States, Canada 
and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, for example (EDGAR, 2017). In addition, China’s non-
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CO2 emissions,1 especially methane and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), are high and are projected 
to nearly double by 2030 under existing policies (Yao et al., 2016).  
China further impacts global and regional climate change through its emissions of black 
carbon. Black carbon, which also contributes to air pollution, has recently emerged as a key 
climate-warming agent and is as such referred to as one of the short-lived climate pollutants 
(SLCPs2) (Bond et al., 2013). It is formed as a result of the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels 
and biomass, and co-emitted with GHGs and other aerosols. Black carbon accelerates global 
warming directly and indirectly through reducing the albedo effect (the ability to reflect sunlight) 
of the surface of the earth. Its emissions have a stronger warming effect on glaciated regions 
including the Arctic (AMAP, 2015: 9), where about 20-25 percent of warming and snow-ice cover 
loss is attributed to the reduction of the albedo effect caused by black carbon (Koch et al., 2011). 
China’s emissions of black carbon have been estimated at 20-24 percent of global emissions for 
the period of 1990-2007 (UNEP, 2015: 11); however, these emissions reportedly fell by 27 percent 
in 2010-2017 due to pollution reduction policies (Zheng et al., 2018). Using biomass, coal or oil 
for cooking and heating in residential and industrial sectors as well as the use of diesel fuel for 
transportation are the main causes of black carbon emissions in China (Zheng et al., 2018). It has 
been shown that two-thirds of black carbon’s warming effects in the Arctic come from non-Arctic 
countries (AMAP, 2015: 9), which highlights the role of China’s emissions in Arctic warming. 
China’s role in driving climate change through its emissions of long-lived GHGs and SLCPs is 
part of the country’s broader environmental footprint in the Arctic. China is a source of a variety 
of pollutants (e.g. persistent organic pollutants and mercury) reaching the Arctic, and Chinese 
policies aimed at controlling such pollutants – if implemented effectively – benefit the Arctic 
environment. The picture of Chinese environmental footprint is complemented by the more direct 
impacts, namely through Chinese investments in Arctic locations. Moreover, China has an indirect 
influence on the Arctic environment and Arctic communities via driving the demand for Arctic 
resources and actions, such as contracts with Arctic states, aimed at securing China’s access to 
these resources. 
                                               
1 The remaining GHGs covered by the Kyoto Protocol include: methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and 
nitrogen trifluoride (NF3). 
2 Others include methane, tropospheric ozone and some hydrofluorocarbons. 
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Persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and other long-range pollutants such as mercury can 
be transported by wind or ocean currents into the Arctic. POPs are deposited in the tissue of 
animals and humans and have noticeable health implications, especially in utilizing traditional 
sources of food (AMAP, 2009a; 2009b). While the global emissions of some POPs have decreased 
significantly, partly due to the adoption of the Stockholm POPs Convention3 – ratified by China 
in 2004 – other pollutants are still of major concern.  
It is very difficult to assess the amount of pollution coming to the Arctic specifically from 
China. However, a few examples of the level of impact referring to East Asia or Asia (with China 
clearly the largest contributor due to the size of its manufacturing sector) can be given (data for 
2000-2014). South-Eastern Asia is responsible for 12% of HCB (hexachlorobenzene) depositions 
over the Arctic (compared to a contribution of 35% by the European continent), and East Asia is 
a source region for 11% of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and 21% of nitrogen oxides (NOx) depositions. 
Lindane (y-HCH) pollution reaching the Arctic from outside of the region comes mainly from 
China, which is responsible for 59% of global emissions. Brominated flame retardants (BFRs) 
come to the Arctic primarily from Asia (69% of depositions in the Arctic) (Cavalieri et al., 2010). 
According to Travnikov (2005), “about half the mercury deposition to the Arctic is due to 
the atmospheric transport from anthropogenic emission sources, of which the greatest contribution 
is made by Asian (33%) and European sources (22%)”. South-East Asia is responsible for 39% of 
global mercury emissions (equal to 685-1430 tonnes of mercury) (UNEP, 2018). The recently 
adopted Minamata Mercury Convention4 – ratified by China in 2016 – gives hope for the gradual 
decrease in the presence of mercury in the environment; however, the effects will be visible only 
in the long-term. 
Historically, a crucial pollutant impacting the Arctic – and to a much greater extent, the 
Antarctic – were ozone-depleting substances (ODSs), in particular chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 
Following the entry into adoption (1982) and entry into force (1989) of the Montreal Protocol, 
global emissions of CFCs have fallen significantly. However, emissions of trichlorofluoromethane 
(CFC-11), the second-most abundant CFC, began to rise after 2012. According to recent findings, 
                                               
3 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 23 May 2001, in force 17 May 
2004, 40 ILM 532 (2001).  
4 Minamata Convention on Mercury, 19 January 2013, in force 16 August 2017, 55 ILM 582 
(2016). 
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one of the key sources of new emissions is probably located in North-East China (likely due to 
foam production) (Rigby et al., 2019).   
An environmental issue currently in focus in the Arctic is pollution with marine litter – 
primarily plastics – and microplastics. Sources of plastic in the Arctic Ocean include shipping, 
fisheries, Arctic rivers, as well as long-range transport via sea currents. Due to limited inflow of 
waters from the Pacific Ocean via cold currents passing the Bering Strait, Chinese litter sources 
are of secondary importance for the Arctic Ocean (PAME, 2019). However, microplastics may be 
airborne and transported long distances (Allen et al., 2019) and thus, China may constitute an 
important source of such airborne pollutants. 
Apart from pollutants emitted within China’s territory – and policies aimed at controlling 
these pollutants – China and Chinese economic operators may affect Arctic habitats in a more 
direct manner through the investments of Chinese companies in Greenland, northern Canada or 
Siberia, for example. Chinese demand for resources is a key contributor to the extractive industries 
investment potential in the Arctic. For instance, in 2013, China imported more than 60% within 
the international iron ore trade, and the country accounted for 44% of global nickel demand in 
2011. China is also a major and growing market for pulp derived from boreal forests. Moreover, 
Chinese shipping activities have marine and air quality impacts in the Arctic, which are bound to 
increase with the growing presence of Chinese vessels in the Arctic Ocean and adjacent waters.  
In contrast to the European Union, which has attempted to assess its environmental 
footprint on the Arctic region (Cavalieri et al., 2010), China has thus far not undertaken such an 
evaluation.  
 
5.3. China’s national goals and environmental challenges in a nutshell             
                          
China is a one-party state without such democratic institutions as general elections. This does not, 
however, mean that the Chinese government can overlook the needs of its citizens. In other words, 
Chinese leaders must consider the question of legitimacy – the right to rule the country – in its 
decision-making. In practice, this means that the government’s policies must address the key 
concern of the Chinese people, which arguably is the maintaining of social stability (see, for 
example, Kopra & Kauppila, 2018; cf. Kallio, 2016). Ever since the beginning of the Reform and 
Opening Up period (gaige kaifang 改革开放) in 1978, one of the core prerequisites for reaching 
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social stability has been material well-being – the sufficient wealth and health of Chinese people. 
For this reason, maintaining rapid economic growth has been a core priority of the Chinese 
government for the past forty years. As a consequence, China has lifted millions of people out of 
absolute poverty and has simultaneously become the world’s second-largest economy, with a 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of USD13,616 billion in 2018, with continued 6.6% year-
on-year growth (National Bureau of Statistics China, 2019).  
The Chinese growth story is remarkable on both national and global scales, but it has also 
made the country’s carbon dioxide emissions the highest in the world and created severe 
environmental problems domestically. The country’s rapid industrialization has been a double-
edged sword, as providing material well-being through improved standards of living and 
employment, the high GDP share of the manufacturing sector (29% in 2017) (World Bank, 2019) 
has also contributed negatively to the state of the country’s environment. Furthermore, the growth 
of heavy industry in particular has been largely fueled by coal, whose largest global producer and 
consumer is China. In 2018, the industrial sector’s overall contribution continued to account for 
approximately 34% of the GDP (National Bureau of Statistics China, 2019), despite the fact that 
China’s new economic policy is to shake off the status of being the “world’s factory” and to 
prioritize quality over quantity through the Made in China strategy (State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2015). In addition, unbalanced and fast-paced urbanization has further 
deteriorated the environment by creating some of the world’s most polluted megacities.    
Given the structure of the country’s economy and considerable population of 1.4 billion 
people, it is clear that China’s energy demand is equally vast. Despite recent investments in 
renewable energy, energy production continues to be a key source of China’s carbon emissions. 
At present, coal accounts for around 59 percent of the country’s energy mix (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2019), causing severe environmental degradation around the country. Given 
the fact that not only the air but also water and soil are largely contaminated by decades of burning 
coal (among other factors), Chinese people have been exposed to various kinds of pollution-related 
health problems, varying from respiratory to cardiovascular and mental health issues (e.g. Liu, Xu 
& Yang, 2018). Indeed, numerous scientific studies have shown that fine particulate matter 
(PM2.5) causes adverse environmental and health impacts in China. In 2010, a million premature 
deaths in China annually were attributed to air pollution (Gu et al., 2018). A growing awareness 
of this linkage between pollution and personal health and wellbeing has provoked numerous 
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pollution-related riots and demonstrations across China, (see, for example, Albert & Xu, 2016; 
Babones, 2017; Kennedy, 2012) to an extent that is hard to estimate in the absence of trustworthy 
and transparent reporting.  
Since the early 2000s, thus, it has became increasingly clear that the government’s pursuit 
to build a harmonious society (hexie shehui 和谐社会) will not be successful without paying more 
attention to environmental protection (e.g. Pan, 2006). In 2007, then-President Hu Jintao officially 
proposed the building of an ecological civilization (shengtai wenming 生态文明) as a new 
guideline for the building up of a moderately well-off society. Although Hu did not offer a clear 
definition of the concept, his report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
indicated that the government had redefined its development model by putting more emphasis on 
sustainable development (Hu, 2007). The concept of an ecological civilization was quickly 
incorporated into the government’s overall policy plans, and it was added to the Constitution of 
the Communist Party of China in 2012 (the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China, 2012). This development put the Chinese government in a position in which it must 
increasingly find a balance between maintaining steady economic growth and reducing the health 
impacts of pollution and other environmental hazards and catastrophes affecting China. 
It is clear that there are strong domestic incentives for China to decrease the use of coal in 
order to improve air quality and public health, and such reductions undoubtedly decrease both 
GHGs and air pollutant emissions as well. To some extent, the Chinese government’s participation 
in the pioneering Arctic liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Northern Siberia’s Yamal Peninsula 
can also be connected to this trend: LNG is viewed as a rising, greener alternative to coal burning. 
The Arctic region is estimated to possess 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas (U.S. 
Geological Survey, 2008), making it too lucrative a frontier for China to ignore, especially with 
the current plan to increase the use of LNG to 10% by 2020 and 15% by 2030 (Xinhua, 2019).  
Not only domestic but also global environmental issues affect social stability in China. The 
Chinese government must equally respond to these challenges in order to prevent instances of civil 
disorder. Out of such global challenges, climate change can be seen to pose the most severe risks. 
In the future, climate change is expected to cause floods, drought and extreme weather events in 
China, all of which can potentially affect not only the everyday life of Chinese citizens but also 
the country’s agriculture and food production, security of supply and military strategies. There 
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seems to be no apparent dispute about these impacts, let alone climate change itself, in China. On 
the contrary, the Chinese government has openly acknowledged that global warming threatens the 
country’s national security. Most tellingly, China’s Arctic strategy and most major policy speeches 
all emphasize the severe consequences of climate change on China (State Council Information 
Office of the People’s Republic of China,  2018; e.g. Zhang, 2015).   
In addition to finding a balance between growth and its costs, another factor that is crucial 
to the legitimacy of the Chinese government is its prowess on the international stage. Due to the 
growing environmental awareness of the Chinese people, taking responsibility for global climate 
change in such contexts as the Arctic high-level meetings is likely to promote a better image of 
the Chinese government and the ruling party among the domestic audience. Indeed, as China rises 
to the status of a global power and the Chinese society becomes increasingly open and integrated 
with the rest of the world, Chinese people are likely to evaluate their government’s worth in terms 
of both domestic and international achievements, a fact that is recognized by the party-state in its 
portrayal of China’s participation in Arctic science activities, for example at the National Museum 
of China in Beijing (see Kopra & Kauppila, 2018). This creates a strong incentive to replenish 
China’s international image in environmental issues and gain a stronger foothold in international 
climate politics.    
 
5.4. From Rio to Paris: China’s changing role in international climate politics 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. As of 2019, it has been ratified by 197 countries 
is often referred to as ‘the Parties to the Convention’ (UNFCCC, 2019). The Convention marks an 
important step for international climate politics because, for the first time, countries agreed to 
stabilize greenhouse gases (GHG) at a non-hazardous level in order to prevent climate change. 
China ratified the Convention in January 1993. However, for a long time, China refused to shoulder 
any responsibility in the UN negotiations for climate change mitigation and highlighted the historic 
responsibility of developed countries to reduce emissions as well as to aid developing countries to 
handle the adverse effects of climate change. 
The legally-binding Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997 and entered into force as late 
as 2005. The burden-sharing of the Kyoto Protocol for 2008-2012 set quantitative emission 
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reductions only for developed countries, including the members of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992 and the Economies in Transition including the 
Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and a number of Central and Eastern European States 
(UNFCCC, 2019). The rest of the Parties were not required to reduce their emissions, as they were 
seen as developing countries. This group included emerging nations such as China, South Africa, 
Brazil and India. The Protocol covered only some 30 percent of global emissions because, amongst 
other factors, the United States (US) never ratified it, and the growing emissions of emerging 
nations were excluded from the quotas (Durand, 2012; Syri et al., 2013). In reality, the number is 
ambiguous since, for example, in 2011 Japan and Russia announced that they would withdraw 
from the protocol (Korhola, 2014). In 2012, only 19 out of 41 countries were expected to achieve 
the given reductions, and on the contrary, emissions actually continued to grow in many of the 
OECD countries (Hurrell, 2012; Napoli, 2012). Developing countries’ position of not having 
binding emission obligations in the Protocol is suggested to be a merit of China for its role as the 
leading negotiator in the developing country group G-77 (Chen, 2012). G-77 represents one major 
group in climate politics and is an important negotiation coalition for China to be included in with 
its 133 members covering ⅔ of the world’s nations. However, the group of developing countries 
has become more diverse, the interests of the group conflict more, and the common identity has 
moderately deteriorated, thereby putting into question the practicality of the group in climate 
negotiations (Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2015). 
China’s first National Program on Climate Change was published in 2007, clearing 
awareness of climate change and promising to agree on voluntary targets for energy 
consumption. At that stage, China was unable to commit to binding emission targets because of 
its coal-dominated energy structure and low per capita income levels (Chen, 2012). In COP13 
(conference of parties) in Bali in 2007, climate action was requested from all Parties for the first 
time – mitigation commitments from developed countries and mitigation actions from 
developing countries (Brunnée & Streck, 2013). The outcome of COP13 also urged the Parties to 
come to an agreement by 2009, which led to the high expectations for COP15 in 2009 in 
Copenhagen. In COP15, Parties disagreed whether to format the agreement to extend the 
mandate of the Kyoto Protocol or negotiate a new agreement (Christoff, 2010). In the end, the 
conference came out only with a weak Copenhagen Accord, from which many blame the 
emerging nations’ negative attitude, especially that of China and India (Hallding et al., 2011; 
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Hurrell, 2012; Brunnée & Streck, 2013). Despite the weak outcome, the legacy of Copenhagen 
can be seen in the strengthening position of the emerging nations within climate politics 
(Hallding et al., 2011). In 2009, the emerging nations Brazil, South Africa, India and China 
founded an annual negotiation coalition, called The BASIC Countries, as a subgroup for the 
developing country bloc G-77 with motivation to strengthen the position of developing countries 
(ibid.) 
Until the 2011 COP17 in Durban, China had determinedly refused to agree to any 
binding climate obligations, preferring voluntary national objectives. However, in 2011 in 
Durban, the Parties agreed to commit to a new legally-binding climate agreement by 2015 to be 
entered into force in 2020 (Roberts, 2016). At this point, all eyes turned to Paris COP21 with 
expectations as great they were before Copenhagen’s meeting in 2009. After Durban, China took 
a more constructive role in international climate negotiations. The remarkable difference in 
China’s role in 2009 in Copenhagen in comparison to Paris in 2015 results from the prioritization 
shift in economic development in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan from energy-intensive growth to 
innovation and low-carbon technologies (Hilton & Kerr, 2017). This change enabled China to 
reformulate its international climate priorities before Paris. For instance, in 2013, the government 
stated that “Since 2012, the Chinese government has taken positive action in enhancing its 
capability across major sectors to adapt to climate change and respond to extreme weather and 
climate-related events” (National Development and Reform Commission, 2013: 27).  
In particular, China began to cooperate with the United States on climate change – a 
crucial development that can be seen as a critical driver to the adoption of a new international 
climate agreement at the COP21 held in Paris in 2015. The Sino-American climate cooperation 
flourished in particular during the Obama administration, and between 2013 and 2016, China and 
the United States issued several joint statements in which the two nations agreed on their shared 
urgency to solve climate change (e.g. National Development and Reform Commission, 2014; 
2015; 2016). In 2014, China and the US made an emission-cutting agreement which has been 
acknowledged as significant also on the global level. In the agreement, China pledged to halt 
carbon emissions growth around 2030. Also, it pledged 3.1 billion USD to developing countries 
to address climate change (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). The deal 
gained widespread international attention prior to COP21, and the text directly encouraged other 
Parties to be inspired by the Sino-American effort and to submit their own contributions. The 
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image of an uncooperative country, as China was accused of being in the negotiations in 2009, 
was at least partly gone in Paris in 2015.  
 
5.5. China and international climate politics in the Paris era 
 
In COP21, Parties delivered the Paris Agreement on the 12th December 2015 with the main targets 
of halting the global average temperature increase to below 2℃ whilst also attempting to limit it 
to 1.5℃ and reaching net zero emissions after 2050 (Ge et al., 2019). The Paris Agreement was 
opened for ratifications on 22nd April 2016 and entered into force on 4th November 2016 after 
reaching the threshold of being ratified by 55 Parties accounting for a minimum of 55% of global 
emissions on 5th October 2016 (UNFCCC, 2019). Paris requires 55% of all global emissions, 
while in comparison, the Kyoto Protocol covered only 55% of the emissions of industrialized 
countries. In Paris, China agreed for the first time to an absolute cap on emissions, dependent on 
international measurements, reporting and verification (MRV) (Hilton & Kerr, 2017).  
 The Paris Agreement is based on states’ voluntary, nationally-determined contributions 
that were first called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) as nations were 
submitting their first ones prior to the finalization of the Agreement. INDCs changed to Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) without the prefix “intended” when a Party ratified the Paris 
Agreement. NDCs are drafted at the national level, considering the domestic circumstances and 
capabilities (Dalby, 2016). At the same time, the Paris Agreement contains several procedural 
obligations, including that each NDC should reflect the highest possible ambition and progress 
beyond the existing pledge. A further important element of the Paris Agreement is its international 
reporting and transparency framework. 
Nationally-determined contributions support the climate negotiation process to shift further 
towards a bottom-up approach and currently represent the public prime channel between the 
international and national climate politics. Thus, the long-term success of the agreement depends 
on the NDCs’ ability and ambition to respond to the targets of the Paris Agreement.  
NDCs were an important source of encouragement for China’s positive attitude towards 
the Paris Agreement since they represent an important bottom-up and voluntary option to 
traditional reduction quotas (Hilton & Kerr, 2017). China submitted its comprehensive 40-page 
long NDC to the UNFCCC in June 2015, which promises by 2030: 
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a) to achieve the peak of carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 and to conduct their best 
efforts to peak early; 
b) to lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level; 
c) to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20%; 
and 
d) to increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters on the 2005 level 
(China’s National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). 
 
To achieve these 2020 and 2030 targets, the NDC document of China introduces a number of 
actions, of which the majority have already been implemented (den Elzen et al., 2016). The 
document highlights the significant impact that developed countries have had on the emissions and 
defines China as a responsible developing country. The contribution also explains China’s will to 
increase the South-South climate cooperation and China’s wish to assist other developing countries 
facing climate change, including small island nations, the least developed countries and African 
countries. The document describes China as motivated to act on climate change because of the 
domestic need for sustainable development and the will to ensure economic, energy, ecological 
and food security and people’s health in addition to China’s willingness for global cooperation. 
However, the NDC document does not mention China or climate change in the context of the 
Arctic region. The document is in agreement with the ideas of the 13th Five-Year Plan as China is 
said to aim for a “moderately prosperous society in an all-around way by 2020 and to create 
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally developed and harmonious modern socialist country by 
the middle of this century” (China’s NDC, 2015: 4).  
The Paris Agreement is credited for its symbolic value of Parties coming into an agreement 
of legally-binding terms but criticized for the wide gap between the ambition of the NDCs and the 
actual targets of the agreement. For example, China’s NDC is ‘little more than business as usual’ 
(Harris, 2017: 102) and “highly insufficient” in order to reach the goal to limit the global 
temperature rise to 2°C unless other states do not implement much more ambitious emissions 
reduction measures (Climate Action Tracker, 2018).  
In 2016, the Sino-American climate cooperation was influenced by the US political 
situation as the Republican Party in the US has, at least until this far, not supported active 
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international climate policy (Kemp, 2016). A few days after the Paris Agreement had entered 
into force, climate sceptic Republican Donald J. Trump was elected US president. During his 
election campaign, several times Trump called climate change a ‘Chinese hoax’ as well as 
announced to nullify the climate policies made by the Obama administration. Therefore, Trump’s 
election instantly elevated China into a new position as a global climate leader – whether or not 
it wanted it or was ready for that in practice (Kopra, 2019). The Chinese government seemed to 
respond to international expectations of its leadership role positively, and many officials 
convinced the international community that China would not change its approach to international 
climate policy despite Trump’s negative approach. In June 2017, Trump indeed decided to 
withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, which caused harsh criticism around the world and 
ended the Sino-American cooperation on climate change. As a leadership vacuum in 
international climate negotiations emerged, the international society began to expect China to 
step in. Notably, the Chinese government did not stand to oppose these expectations, but pledged 
to increase cooperation with the European Union instead. Remarkably, president Xi Jinping 
declared in his speech to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that China 
had taken a “driving seat” in international climate negotiations and hence had “become an 
important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological 
civilization” (Xi, 2017: 4). 
In COP24 in Katowice in 2018, Parties were urged to agree on implementation, and the 
conference finally delivered a rulebook for the Paris Agreement. In the Paris Agreement, Parties 
committed to an ambition mechanism regarding the NDC documents: approximately every five 
years, Parties must submit a new, more ambitious, nationally-determined contribution to 
UNFCCC. Critics to the 2018 Paris rulebook were quick to point out that the commitment for 
increased ambition is not defined clearly enough in the key chapter of the rulebook. Hence, the 
expectations vary for the second round of NDCs. The Marshall Islands were the first country to 
submit their second NDC in November 2018 but the other Parties, including China, are expected 
to submit theirs during 2019 and 2020 (UNFCCC INDC Submission Portal, 2019). The ambition 
mechanism was meant to make the Paris Agreement responsive to the message of the 2018 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report and to enable Parties to scale 
up their commitments to reach the 1.5℃ target. However, at present, it remains unclear whether 
China is willing to enhance its NDC under the Paris Agreement in an ambitious manner or whether 
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it will more determinately emphasize the historic responsibility of developed countries – as it and 
other BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries did in the UN climate negotiations 
in Bonn in 2017. China’s historical emissions will soon override the other Parties’ but China can 
still argue for its lower per capita emissions which will still be, thanks to the great population, a 
real argument in the near future (Woon, 2018). With the business-as-usual model, also the per 
capita emissions of China will reach the average of the developed countries by 2030 (IEA, 2011). 
The increased cooperation between the EU and China especially from 2018 onwards 
could support China to submit a more ambitious pledge. In particular, the agreement that China 
and the EU made in July 2018 to intensify their cooperation on climate change and clean energy 
is a positive sign, and there are many opportunities for collaboration in the fields of emissions 
trading systems, energy efficiency, clean energy and technology, low-emission transportation, 
and low-carbon cities, etc. In April 2019, the two nations published the EU-China Summit Joint 
Statement (2019) in which they express the will to a deeper cooperation in addressing global 
environmental challenges such as pollution and marine litter. The statement was viewed 
“promising” by Europe's largest coalition of non-governmental organizations working on climate 
and energy issues (CAN Europe, 2019).  
 
5.6. China’s Arctic strategy and climate change 
 
In January 2018, China’s State Council Information Office published its long-awaited Arctic 
white paper. According to the paper, the state’s goals in the region include “to understand, 
protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common 
interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable 
development of the Arctic”. “While pursuing its own interests”, the white paper explains, “China 
will pay due regard to the interests of other countries and the broader international community, 
bear in mind the importance of the protection and development of the Arctic, and of keeping in 
proper balance its current and long-term interests, so as to promote the sustainable development 
of the Arctic”. The white paper identifies “sustainability” as “the fundamental goal” of China’s 
Arctic engagement, which, in turn, “means promoting the sustainable development of the Arctic 
by ensuring the sustainability of environmental protection, resource utilization and human 
activities in the area”. Furthermore, it “means realizing harmonious coexistence between man 
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and nature, better coordination between ecological protection, economic growth and social 
progress, better balance between utilization, management and protection, and intergenerational 
equity” (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China,  2018). Notably, 
the white paper does not mention the concept of ecological civilization at all.  
Defining China as a ‘near-Arctic state’, China’s Arctic white paper emphasizes that the 
“natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate 
system and ecological environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, 
forestry, fishery, the marine industry and other sectors” (State Council Information Office of the 
People’s Republic of China,  2018). Scientific findings do indeed show that Arctic climate 
change causes risks to human security and ecosystems in China. For example, many of China’s 
coastal mega-cities, such as Shanghai, Tianjin and Hong Kong, are expected to suffer from 
flooding due to rising sea levels caused by the melting of sea ice in the Arctic. Moreover, Arctic 
climate change is also expected to increase haze pollution in eastern China (Wang, Chen & Liu, 
2015) as well as alter many global natural processes, causing changes likely to hamper China’s 
agricultural production. As discussed above, air pollution and food security are critical factors of 
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, it is unsurprising that scientific 
research on climate change is one of the key interests of China’s Arctic policies, and the Chinese 
government wants to learn more about the linkages between Arctic climate change, natural 
cycles, domestic interests, and social stability in China (for more information, see Chapter 4).  
Although China’s Arctic white paper notes that “China’s emission reduction measures 
have a positive impact on the climatic and ecological environment of the Arctic”, it does not 
introduce additional measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in China. Thus, China’s 
Arctic strategy pays more attention to the link between Arctic climate change and the adverse 
effects of climate change in China than to the ways in which the world’s largest carbon emitter 
could mitigate Arctic climate change. A key reason for this may be that China uses “climate 
change as a key justification for its Arctic engagement” (Kopra, 2020), and it argues that due to 
Arctic climate change’s adverse effects on the Chinese society, the Chinese government has 
special interests in the region and it should be accepted as a legitimate participant in the regional 
governance. However, China could also legitimate its growing regional role by announcing 
additional, ambitious measures to cut greenhouse gas emissions, a move that China’s Arctic 
strategy fails to take. In broader terms, such tightening of domestic climate policy measures 
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would prove to the world that China is ready to play a leadership role in international climate 
policy (Kopra, 2019).   
 
5.7. China and global cooperation on SLCPs 
 
Global cooperation efforts have expanded recently to cover emissions of SLCPs, the reduction of 
which helps mitigate short-term climate change and, in some cases, air pollution.5 As explained 
above, SLCPs refer to GHGs such as methane, some HFCs and tropospheric ozone as well as black 
carbon, which is an aerosol. What unites them under one label – apart from their climate impact – 
is their relatively short lifetime in the atmosphere compared to CO2. This implies that rapid 
reduction in SCLPs will lead to relatively quick gains in terms of climate change mitigation. That 
said, reducing SLCPs is viewed as only complementary to CO2 reductions, which are essential for 
addressing long-term global climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014: 
20). In addition, methane, tropospheric ozone and black carbon contribute to air pollution, which 
implies that there are significant co-benefits of their reductions for public health and the 
environment. 
Many international regimes and institutions are relevant for reducing SLCPs and hence the 
related legal and governance regime is complex and fragmented. Methane and HFC emissions 
have traditionally been discussed under the UNFCCC. The latter have also recently been 
designated to be phased out under the Kigali amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  
In addition to these, in the last decade global initiatives have emerged to draw attention 
specifically to SLCPs and the co-benefits of their reductions. The main initiative is the Climate 
and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), a voluntary government-led partnership that was launched in 
2011 with the goal to raise awareness and improve scientific understanding of SLCPs, build 
capacities, strengthen national and regional actions, and promote best practices. The Coalition has 
been successful in generating support from 64 states and 73 intergovernmental and non-
                                               
5 This section draws on Yamineva & Liu 2019; and Yamineva & Kulovesi 2018. 
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governmental organizations thus far. China is not a member of the CCAC but participates in its 
meetings as an observer state.  
The Arctic Council has also been proactive in addressing SLCPs, specifically black carbon 
and methane emissions. It has done so through scientific assessments and the adoption of the 
Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions (Arctic 
Council, 2015a). Under the Framework, the Arctic States committed themselves to taking national 
mitigation actions and to a collective goal to limit black carbon emissions to between 25% and 
33% below 2013 levels by 2025 (Arctic Council, 2017). The Framework also aims to raise 
awareness of SLCPs among observer states whose emissions impact the Arctic and to welcome 
their participation in the implementation of the Framework, for instance in the development and 
improvement of emissions inventories. Indeed, seven observer states, including France, Poland, 
Japan, Korea, and India, along with the EU have voluntarily submitted their national reports on 
black carbon and methane emissions reductions (Arctic Council, 2015b). As of May 2019, China 
has not submitted its national report.  
China’s passive stance when it comes to participating in global cooperation on SLCPs is 
partly explained by the immaturity of its domestic discussion and policy approach to the subject. 
There has been limited attention on the part of policy-makers to methane and black carbon 
emissions, although there are signs of that changing. China’s domestic climate policy has primarily 
focused on CO2, and this approach is reflected in its NDC to the UNFCCC, which includes only 
CO2 targets. In principle, as CO2, methane and black carbon are often co-emitted by the same 
sources, measures to reduce CO2 emissions will lead to reductions in SLCPs; however, the degree 
of such reductions is unclear. China’s 13th FYP highlights the importance of tackling non-CO2 
GHGs but specific policy measures are yet to be developed. On black carbon, the main challenge 
is insufficient data on emissions and limited understanding of their sources, impacts and mitigation 
pathways. There are no policies targeting black carbon emissions per se; however, black carbon is 
a component of PM2.5, which is covered by quantified air quality targets. Overall, synergies 
between climate and air quality goals have been receiving more and more recognition in recent 
policies, for instance in the new Three-year Action Plan for Winning the Blue Sky War (2018–
2020); however, related actions are still short on detail.  
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5.8. China’s domestic climate, air quality and energy policies 
 
China is the largest energy consumer and largest emitter of CO2 emissions in the world; 
Between 1978-2014, China’s total energy production increased annually by 4.83% and its total 
energy consumption by 5.58% (Zhang et al., 2017). Since the late 2000s, China has formulated 
various domestic policies to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Its climate 
mitigation policies have mostly focused on CO2 emissions, as explained above. However, China 
has not indicated how much its emissions will grow before they peak. Between 2014 and 2016, it 
seemed that the peak had already been reached. In 2017, however, China’s carbon dioxide 
emissions grew again to 9.1 Gt, which is a 1% increase from the 2014 emission level (IEA, 
2018). Despite this negative trend towards peaking, in 2017 China’s economy grew by 7%, 
which could have caused emissions to increase more, but thanks to the deployment of 
renewables and accelerating the switch from coal to gas, overall emissions grew only by 1.7% 
(ibid.). Though coal demand seemed to peak in China in 2013, the growing energy demand has 
increased energy-related emissions by raising the demand for oil and gas (ibid.). The scenarios of 
the possible peak in Chinese emissions vary considerably depending on GDP growth 
assumptions and the development of policy implementation, amongst other factors (den Elzen et 
al., 2016). All these scenarios agree that reaching the peak before 2030 would require China to 
implement new climate policies (ibid.) 
Like elsewhere, energy policy plays an especially important role in China’s climate 
policy. To decrease reliance on coal and other (imported) fossil fuels, China’s 13th Five-Year 
Plan orders an increase in the proportion of non-fossil fuel energy to 15 percent of total energy 
consumption and a decrease in the consumption of coal to below 55 percent. In efforts to 
promote the production of non-fossil fuel energy, hydropower and nuclear energy are important. 
China is the biggest source of hydropower in the world, and the installed capacity of hydropower 
exceeded 100,000 megawatts in 2004, 200,000 megawatts in 2010 and 300,000 megawatts in 
2015 (Li et al., 2018). Still, China’s huge hydropower projects such as the Three Gorges Dam 
(Sanxia Daba 三峡大坝) have caused severe social and environmental damage on a local scale. 
In April 2019, there were 45 nuclear plants in operation, about 15 under construction, plus more 
about to start construction on mainland China, meaning that the number of nuclear power plants 
has increased more than tenfold since 2000 (World Nuclear Association, 2019).  
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Furthermore, China has invested heavily in renewable energy and is unquestionably the 
leader of renewable growth — Chinese renewables now account for 16.7% of the global total 
(IEA, 2017; Zhang et al., 2017). It is the world leader in solar energy by manufacturing about 60 
percent of global solar cell capacity and by using about half of global solar power per year. In 
2017 alone, China installed at least 50 gigawatts of solar power capacity, which means that it 
already exceeded the 13th Five-Year Plan’s target of 105 gigawatts (Buckley, Nicholas & 
Brown, 2018). Solar power will affect China’s energy mixture dramatically in the future (Zhang 
et al., 2017). 
Moreover, China has abundant wind energy resources and it is able to develop wind 
power on a large scale (Sahu, 2018). In 2016, China represented 35 percent of global cumulative 
wind power installations. The objective of the 13th Five-Year Plan for wind power is at least 210 
gigawatts, and China is expected to achieve the target in 2019 (IEA, 2017). China’s Arctic white 
paper defines the region as a source of “clean” energy: 
 
The Arctic region boasts an abundance of geothermal, wind, and other clean 
energy resources. China will work with the Arctic States to strengthen clean 
energy cooperation, increase exchanges in respect of technology, personnel and 
experience in this field, explore the supply of clean energy and energy 
substitution, and pursue low-carbon development (State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2018). 
 
The government has made serious efforts to decrease energy demand by promoting energy 
conservation and energy efficiency. The growth of renewables is still challenged by the lack of 
adequate technology and innovation, as for instance a remarkable share of the renewable 
generation capacity is currently wasted because of insufficient electricity grids (Zhang et al., 
2017). The government has closed ineffective power plants and small or outdated industrial 
factories, promoted the development of modern, energy-saving technology and products and has 
also established national standards to improve automotive fuel economy, for instance. The 
Chinese government also employs market approaches to reducing emissions although these are 
viewed as mostly complementary to traditional command-and-control policies (Duan, 2015). A 
national carbon market was launched in 2017 with the initial focus on the power sector (Pike & 
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Zhe, 2017). The market was designed to be the world’s largest emissions trading system, 
accounting for about 30% of national emissions with a coverage of 1700 power companies and 
three billion tonnes in total greenhouse gas emissions (ICAP, 2019).  
Despite the growth of renewables and the launching of the carbon market, coal represents 
an important role in China’s economic development and currently accounts for 70% of the 
primary supply (Zhang et al., 2017). Hence, the total energy mixture requires a greater change in 
order to be able to reach peak emissions by 2030.   
The number of cars is expected to more than triple by the end of the next decade in 
China, which could cause severe air pollution locally and inhibit the states from reaching peak 
emissions by 2030 (Zheng et al., 2015). In order to boost the development of electric vehicles, 
the government has launched many plans and policies, the most influential being the 
announcement to ban the production and sale of fossil fuel cars in the near future. In 2018, China 
also issued the China VI Emission Standard (Guoliu Paifang Biaozhun 国六排放标准) that 
orders all new diesel heavy-duty vehicles introduced to the market after July 2021 to have diesel 
particulate filters. If efficiently implemented, this means that all new heavy duty vehicles in 
China will be soot-free after 2021 (Cui & Minjares, 2018). 
Furthermore, the development of green technologies plays an important role in China’s 
efforts towards the ‘greenization’ of its society as well as developing the country as a 
‘knowledge power’. China’s participation in Arctic LNG projects supports these goals by 
increasing (technical) knowhow, and the government is making efforts to replace coal and oil 
with natural gas, a less environmentally-harmful fossil fuel. A good example of linkages between 
Chinese and Arctic partners in the area of renewable energy is a large-scale joint geothermal 
project between Sinopec (Zhongguo Shihua 中国石化) and the Arctic Green Energy 
Corporation, with the latter partner being focused on utilising Icelandic geothermal energy 
expertise internationally (Arctic Green Energy Corporation, n.d.). 
Due to public discontent caused by ‘Airpocalypses’ (severe haze and smog episodes in 
many Chinese megacities), the Chinese government has taken the issue of air pollution seriously. 
For example, in 2014 it declared a ‘War Against Pollution’, a major campaign targeted at 
altering energy production and consumption (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
2014), whereas in 2016, the government issued a “Healthy China 2030 Plan”, which underlined 
the efforts to tackle the health impacts of the country’s environmental challenges (Central 
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Committee of the People’s Republic of China, 2016). For instance, the Air Pollution Action Plan 
(2013-2017) forced key regions to significantly decrease PM2.5 levels, resulting in dramatic 
improvements of air quality in Beijing (Zheng et al., 2018). Moreover, the 13th Five-Year Plan 
(2016-2020) (Shisanwu Guihua “十三五”规划) pledges to “ensure that the concentration of fine 
particulate matter is reduced by at least 25%” and sets key indicators for air quality: the 
percentage of days experiencing “good” or “excellent” air quality in cities at and above the 
prefectural level, with the target being 80 percent. The cities that fail to meet the target 
percentage should reduce PM2.5 intensity by 18 percent. These targets were reiterated by the 
Three-Year Action Plan (Sannian Xingdong Jihua 三年行动计划) for Winning the Blue Sky 
War (2018-2020) (Daying Lantian Baoweizhan 打赢蓝天保卫战), published in July 2018. 
China's efforts to move away from coal-based energy production domestically stand 
somewhat in contrast to its investments abroad. A recent report by the Institute for Energy 
Economics and Financial Analysis highlighted that a significant percentage of Chinese offshore 
investments – including primary financing provided by China's state-controlled financial 
institutions – go into coal projects in South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean basin and in Africa in 
general. The report states that "Chinese finance continues to play a significant role in global coal 
development, supporting over one-quarter of all coal plants currently under development outside 
China" (Shearer, Brown & Buckley, 2019). This comes at a time when many other financial 
institutions, including the World Bank, multilateral development banks, or OECD countries' 
financial institutions, among others, are pulling out of such investments due to both climate and 
environmental goals as well as poor long-term economic assessments of coal energy projects. 
Chinese investments in coal projects lock in a significant amount of carbon emissions for 40 to 
50 years. Simultaneously, Chinese companies are being provided with contracts related to 
construction and management of coal power plants, which partly explains the continued 
willingness of Chinese financial institutions to engage in such projects. 
Other Chinese foreign investments can also be considered from the viewpoint of their 
long-term climate impacts, in particular in reference to resource extraction projects. The recent 
Global Resources Outlook (International Resource Panel, 2019) highlighted that around 17% of 
global emissions are related to the extraction and refining of non-energy resources before these 
are used in manufacturing. A further 17% of emissions are connected to the extraction and 
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refining of fossil fuels, even before these are burned for energy. Therefore, Chinese mining 
projects abroad – as with all other foreign resource extraction financing – should be a part of the 




China is the world’s biggest CO2 emitter and a significant contributor of SLCPs and other 
pollutants that cause environmental harm in the Arctic and beyond. In addition, the ecological 
footprint of China’s BRI continues to be large, especially due to investments in the coal industry. 
Hence, China plays a crucial role in climate and environmental protection in the High North. Given 
the state’s ‘highly insufficient’ ambition to limit the global temperature rise to 2C or 1.5C (Climate 
Action Tracker, 2018), raising the level of ambition of China’s climate mitigation pledged in the 
second NDC would clearly be necessary for a resilient future of the region (and the whole planet). 
However, China is not likely to commit itself to a very ambitious emissions reductions target in 
the future; such a commitment would cause a high risk of 'losing face’ in the case of failing to 
reach the target. Yet climate change mitigation and adaptation are in China’s domestic interest, as 
is engagement in global cooperation, and it will continue to play an active role in the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. This is also important for preventing environment-related 
protests at home and, thus, maintaining social stability and the communist party’s ruling position 
in the country.  
Although it is unlikely that China can commit to a significantly more ambitious mitigation 
target in the near future, there are several openings that can be explored to strengthen the 
involvement of China in global cooperation on climate change. For instance, though China has 
made great progress with renewable energy production, the share of renewables in China’s energy 
mix still remains below the world average because of the high energy demand. The increase in the 
share of renewable energy offers China a good option to enhance the ambition level of its climate 
policy in the near future. Another opportunity for China arises in emphasizing interconnections 
between air quality, public health and climate policies in such cases as through the focus on SLCPs. 
Opportunities should be explored to engage China more closely in the related work under the 
Arctic Council and the CCAC. Given that adequate scientific knowledge and emission inventories 
are a prerequisite to stronger actions, scientific cooperation also needs to be strengthened through 
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both scientific organizations and science-policy bodies such as the IPCC. Moreover, the 
“greenification” of the BRI projects would be necessary in order to reach the goals of the Paris 
agreement. Chinese financing institutions should assess and be transparent about the climate and 
environmental footprint of the investments they support, in particular those related to resource 
extraction, fossil fuels and coal power. 
Beyond climate change, it would be important to assess the Arctic footprint of China’s 
domestic emissions of pollutants that are prone to long-range transport into the Arctic 
environment, including persistent organic pollutants and mercury. The understanding of such 
impacts should be taken into account in future policymaking aimed at emissions reductions. In this 
way, China could show that it carries out domestic environmental policies in a way that contributes 
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